We present a formal model of argumentation based on situation calculus which captures both the logical and the procedural aspects of argumentation processes. The logic is used to determine what is accepted by each agent participating in the discussion and by the group as a whole, on the basis of the speech acts performed during argumentation. Argumentation protocols, also called rules of order, describe declaratively which speech acts are legal in a particular state of the argumentation. We rst discuss argumentation with xed rules of order. Our model tolerates protocol violations but makes it possible to object to illegal actions. In realistic settings the rules of order themselves can at any time become the topic of the debate. We show how meta level argumentation of this kind can be modelled in what we call dynamic argument systems. To illustrate the notions introduced in the paper we present a reconstruction of Rescher's theory of formal disputation and a dynamic argument system with three levels which we use to discuss a murder case.
Introduction
In this paper we present a formal model of argumentation. Argumentation here means the process by which agents try to convince other agents that certain propositions hold. This form of communication is sometimes also called critical discussion 44] or disputation 33] .
Argumentation plays a central role in the communication of human and arti cial agents and is an ubiquitous task in professional and every day life. Argumentation may take place in rather informal settings between two agents, but there are also highly structured forms of argumentation with di erent roles for the participants and prede ned procedures for exchanging arguments and reaching a fair decision. Probably the best example for such a highly structured form is legal argumentation where defendant, prosecutor, judge, etc. obviously play di erent roles and where legal rules govern the way arguments are brought forward. The goal of the legal procedure is to guarantee that fair decisions can be reached e ectively.
The study of argumentation has a long tradition in philosophy reaching back at least to Aristotle. With the breakthrough of formal logic in the 20th century semantical and proof theoretical questions became dominating issues in logic. Nevertheless, a number of philosophers like Toulmin 37] , Lorenzen 18 ], Hamblin 12] , and more recently Walton and Krabbe 44, 43] , van Eemeren and Grootendorst 41] and many others have emphasized the dialectical aspects of reasoning and studied, formally or informally, various aspects of argumentation.
In recent years the formal study of argumentation became a hot topic in Articial Intelligence, in particular in the area of multi-agent-systems and in nonmonotonic/uncertain reasoning.
The focus or much of the argumentation research in multi-agent-systems (for a few representative examples see 22, 35, 29] ) was the role of argumentation for negotiation and reaching agreement. In nonmonotonic and uncertain reasoning argument systems were used to de ne inference systems for existing nonmonotonic logics (e.g. 10]), or to de ne a nonstandard (most often nonmonotonic) consequence relation for a particular logic based on some notion of argument 24, 25, 9, 15, 5, 7, 1, 27] . Although these papers di er in technical detail and the underlying formal languages all of them use notions of undercutting and defeat among arguments to de ne criteria for acceptability of arguments, respectively propositions supported by arguments. 28] and 6] provide excellent overviews.
The focus of this paper is di erent. We do not intend to propose a speci c new logic, particularly well-suited for argumentation (although we present a logic which we use throughout the paper in Section 2). We doubt that one single logic of this kind exists and believe that picking the right logic heavily depends on the particular area and type of debate. In fact, our general de nition of argument systems will not depend on any particular logic of disputation. Such a logic (be it nonmonotonic or not, de ned in terms of arguments or not) is one of the parameters that need to be instantiated when speci c argument systems are built.
Our major interest is to capture, in a single framework, both the logical and the procedural aspects of argumentation. Our formal account describes which propositions are accepted, by a particular agent or by the group as a whole, in a particular state of the argumentation. But it also formalizes the speech acts that can be performed by members of the group as well as the \rules of order" used to establish whether a speech act can legally be performed in a state of the debate. It is this combination of logic and procedure that distinguishes our approach from the work on nonmonotonic argument systems mentioned earlier and puts us in the tradition of researchers like Rescher, Loui, Gordon, Prakken, Vreeswijk and others who take not only the logical, but also the procedural character of argumentation seriously and who view argumentation as the process of jointly constructing a commonly accepted theory.
Our approach is in uenced by Rescher's theory of formal disputation, as developed in his 1977 book Dialectics: A Controversy-Oriented Approach to the Theory of Knowledge 33] . Rescher views formal disputation as a three player game involving a proponent, an opponent, and a determiner whose role it is to decide who the winner of the debate is, based on the plausibility of arguments put forward. Rescher's account remains informal to a large extent. In 2] a logical reconstruction of Rescher's theory based on a version of Reiter's default logic 30] with speci city was given. The major goal of the present paper is to abstract from (the formal reconstruction of) Rescher's theory a general framework for argumentation. To de ne speci c argument systems as instances of the framework one has, among other things, to x a logic of debate, a set of speech acts, and the rules of order. All argument systems de ned that way exhibit, as we believe, the spirit of Rescher style disputations.
Another important source of inspiration for the work presented here was Gordon's formalization of legal pleading 11]. In the spirit of Rescher, Gordon combines nonmonotonic reasoning with game theoretic notions of argumentation. Legal pleading is conceived as a particular language game. Gordon identi es 10 rather complex moves proponent and opponent can make in this game. The applicability conditions of these moves refer to an underlying nonmonotonic logic, namely Ge ner and Pearl's conditional entailment 10]. Also Gordon's pleadings game can be viewed as an instance of the framework to be developed in this paper.
Formal models of argumentation must be highly exible and adjustable, otherwise they simply will be unable to capture important aspects of realistic argumentation processes. The following properties seem essential:
1. Declarative representation of the argumentation protocol Protocols describe which actions are allowed, respectively forbidden, in a particular state of the argumentation. It is obvious that deontic notions play an important role here (although a full edged deontic logic may not be needed to represent a protocol). Declarative representations of the protocol not only make it easier to understand them but are a necessary condition for reasoning about and possibly changing the protocol (see 3.).
Protocol violations
Protocols describe normative standards. People often deviate from the ideal behaviour and violate norms. Strictly enforcing normative behaviour (this is sometimes called regimentation, see for instance 16]), although possible in principle, is not an adequate way of dealing with this fact. An overly strict system runs the risk of not being accepted by potential users. What is needed is a much more exible view where protocols weakly constrain potential courses of argumentation without strictly enforcing normative behaviour. In particular, protocol violations should be possible if nobody objects. In our approach we admit argumentation states obtained through illegal actions. However, every group member has the right to object to such actions and to \undo" their consequences.
Dynamic changes of protocol
In realistic settings the rules of order themselves can, at any time, become the current topic of the debate. It is common, for instance, that in a trial about a certain murder case lawyers disagree as to whether making a certain claim is legal or not. In that situation a debate about the accepted rules of order may start, rules may be changed and new rules invented until agreement about the rules of order is reached. This form of meta debate can lead to a meta meta debate and so on. The need to formalize argumentation about the rules of argumentation has been discussed, for instance by Loui 19] who writes: \Locutions pertain not only to the substance of dispute, but also to the protocol. Arguments can advance claims about how to de ne or alter the protocol". Vreeswijk 42] has formalized restricted forms of meta debates of this kind. We will discuss his approach in more detail in the concluding section. Our goal is to formalize meta debates in a much more exible way, not restricted to the rst meta level. Our formalization is based on situation calculus, one of the major AI approaches to reasoning about action and modeling dynamic systems 20, 17, 32] . More precisely, we use the dialect of situation calculus developed in Toronto by Ray Reiter and his colleagues. In particular, our representation of argumentation records -which are used to keep track of the history and current state of argumentation -corresponds to the representation of situations in situation calculus. Basically, situations are histories of actions, argumentation records histories of speech acts performed during argumentation. The e ects of speech acts are described by Reiter style successor state axioms 31, 32] .
Let us conclude this introduction with some remarks about the role of formalizations of the kind developed in this paper. As pointed out by Wooldridge and Jennings 45] formal theories can at least serve two purposes: they can be contributions to formal philosophy attempting to capture certain human activities in a precise way. They also can serve as speci cations for future computer systems. We hope that our formalization can be useful in both respects.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we introduce preferential default logic, the logic we use as the logic of disputation in all examples of this paper. Readers satis ed with an intuitive understanding of this logic may skip this section. Section 3 reviews the basic notions of situation calculus. Section 4 investigates argumentation with xed rules of order and introduces the notion of a static argument system. Section 5 presents, as a rst case study, a new reconstruction of Rescher's theory of formal disputation. Section 6 investigates argumentation with dynamic rules of order and introduces dynamic argument systems in which meta level debates are possible. Section 7 discusses a particular dynamic argument system based on three levels and illustrates its behaviour using a debate about a murder case. Section 8 discusses related work and concludes.
A logic for argumentation
In this section we present preferential default logic, the logic used in this paper to de ne speci c argument systems. The ideas underlying this logic were rst developed in the context of logic programming 4] and later extended to full default logic in 3]. As mentioned earlier, we do not want to claim that this logic is the single best available logic for this purpose. The choice of the most adequate logic depends on the type of debate, and a number of good alternatives exist. Nevertheless, preferential default logic has a number of properties which seem relevant for many kinds of argumentation:
1 Recall that a partial order is a well-ordering i every subset of the elements has the least element. Any well-ordering is a total ordering.
Conclusions of prioritized default theories are de ned in terms of preferred extensions, which are a subset of their extensions. The proposition basically says that in preferred extensions defaults which are not applied must be defeated by defaults with higher priority.
The general case of arbitrary prioritized default theories can then be reduced to this case as follows: Let = (D; W; <) be a prioritized default theory. E is a prioritized extension of i E is a prioritized extension of a fully prioritized default theory 0 = (D; W; < 0 ) such that d < d 0 implies d < 0 d 0 .
In 3] we investigated two natural principles for preference handling in rule based nonmonotonic system. Principle I says that if the generating defaults for two extensions di er in exactly one default, and the di ering default used to generate E 2 is less preferred than the one used to generate E 1 , then E 2 should not be a preferred extension. Principle II says that the preferences of rules whose prerequisites are not in an extension should not be used to rule out this extension (see 3] for precise de nitions). We have the following proposition 3]:
Proposition 3 Prioritized default logic satis es both Principles I and II.
It turns out that most of the alternative approaches to preference handling in default logic described in the literature do not satisfy these principles.
To make reasoning about default priorities possible we must be able to refer to defaults explicitly, and we must introduce a special predicate symbol representing default preferences. We, therefore, extend our logical language in two respects. An extension of a preferential default theory = (D; W; name) is just a classical extension of (D; W).
The preference information now is contained in the extensions of . What we need is a way to eliminate an extension if it contains priority information which is in con ict with the way the extension was generated. Basically, an extension E of a preferential default theory is preferred i E is a preferred extension of a fully prioritized default theory (D; W; <) such that < is compatible with the preference information in E. Compatibility is tested by generating a syntactic description of < in terms of and checking whether this description is consistent with E.
De nition 5 Let = (D; W; name) be a preferential default theory. Then, a set of formulas E is a preferred extension of if and only if E is a preferred extension of some fully prioritized default theory (D; W; <) such that < is compatible with E.
We say < is compatible with E if and only if E fd i d k j r i < r k ; name(r i ) = d i ; name(r k ) = d k g is consistent.
For further discussion of this approach and motivating examples see 4, 3] . An in depth understanding of preferential default logic will not be needed to follow our examples in the rest of this paper.
Situation calculus
The situation calculus was originally proposed by John McCarthy and Pat Hayes 20, 21] in the sixties as a means of representing actions and change in classical logic. Intuitively, properties of the world which may change through actions (so-called uents) are indexed with the situation in which they hold. In the original proposal a situation is a snapshot of the state of the world. Reiter proposed to view situations as histories of actions. We follow in this paper Reiter's view and use his variant of the situation calculus. Reiter's book draft 32] provides an excellent introduction.
The language of the situation calculus is a second order language with sorts for actions and situations. Other sorts may be added depending on the application. The constant S 0 denotes the initial situation, do(a; s) denotes the situation obtained by performing action a in situation s. s < s 0 means situation s is a proper subhistory of situation s 0 . poss(a; s) says that it is possible to perform action a in situation s.
Reiter uses the following foundational axioms for situation calculus :s < S 0 s < do(a; s 0 ) s v s 0 do(a 1 ; s 1 ) = do(a 2 ; s 2 ) ! a 1 = a 2^s1 = s 2 (8P ):P (S 0 )^(8a; s) P(s) ! P(do(a; s))] ! (8s)P (s)
The last axiom is a second order induction axiom which is needed if one wants to derive properties of all situations.
A possibility axiom is a sentence of the form poss(A(x 1 ; : : : ; x n ); s) A (x 1 ; : : : ; x n ; s)
where A (x 1 ; : : : ; x n ; s) is a formula whose free variables are in x 1 ; : : : ; x n ; s, and which is uniform in s. The latter condition, intuitively, means that the formula does not mention poss and <, it does not quantify over situation variables, it does not mention equality on situations, and the only situation it refers to is s. A successor state axiom for a (relational) uent 1 F is a sentence of the form F(x 1 ; : : : ; x n ; do(a; s)) F (x 1 ; : : : ; x n ; a; s)
where F (x 1 ; : : : ; x n ; a; s) is a formula whose free variables are in x 1 ; : : : ; x n ; a; s, and which is uniform in s.
Successor state axioms provide a (somewhat restricted) solution to the frame problem: how to describe what does not change when an event occurs. They can be derived automatically from e ect axioms for actions. An e ect axiom for action a describes the changes which result from performing action a 32]. In the rest of this paper we will make use of the notions developed above. In particular, we represent states of argumentation as situations which in our context will be called argumentation records. We use a single uent premise(g; q; r) to express that in situation r agent g accepts q as a premise. However, we will also extend \standard" situation calculus whenever necessary. In particular, it turns out that the uniformity requirement for successor state axioms is somewhat too restrictive for our purposes. Uniformity guarantees what is often called the Markov property: a successor state depends only on the immediately preceding state. In our context we sometimes need to refer to earlier states. For instance, we will use an object action which undoes the e ects of illegal actions and restores the state before the illegal action. We therefore need slightly more general successor state axioms. Furthermore, we will admit nonmonotonic logics as the underlying inference mechanisms, and we will need deontic notions to represent protocols. 4 Argumentation with xed protocol
Components of argument systems
Before we introduce our formalization we would like to discuss in this subsection informally what needs to be represented in our model of argumentation.
First of all, we need a group description, that is we have to x the participants of the discussion, or, in other words, the members of the group engaged in the disputation. Moreover, di erent members of the group may have di erent roles which may come with di erent rights and/or obligations (e.g. chairperson vs. ordinary group members; defendent vs. prosecutor vs. judge; proponent vs. opponent; etc.).
Next, the possible speech acts that might be performed need to be speci ed, together with information about when they are possible, and what their e ects are. We assume that each argument system has at least actions for claiming, retracting and conceding propositions. Moreover, it should be possible to object to illegal actions. Other actions (like proposing a new rule of order or voting) are optional.
We also need a language to express the propositions which are claimed, retracted etc. together with a corresponding consequence relation, that is, we need a logic which we call the logic of disputation. In many cases this logic will be nonmonotonic, that is, it will be possible to use statements representing default knowledge in the argumentation.
We need to keep track of the history and current state of the argumentation. We will use so-called argumentation records for this purpose. These correspond to situations in situation calculus. It must be possible to determine what is accepted by each group member and by the group as a wholerepresenting default knowledge in a particular state. To nd out whether a group member, say g, accepts a proposition q, it must be possible to determine the premises currently accepted by g, and whether q follows from these in the logic of disputation.
The argumentation protocol is used to determine whether a person p is allowed to perform an action a in the current state of debate. We want this protocol to be described declaratively, by specifying the rules of order used in the discussion. More precisely, the rules of order are expressed in a logic L 0 which has terms for actions, L-propositions, persons and argumentation records. A binary predicate legal is used to determine whether it is legal to perform action a given an argumentation record r. We call L 0 the logic of procedure, or the meta logic. Often L and L 0 will not di er wrt the underlying inference mechanisms, however they di er in the language (unless L is fully self-referential and has a quoting mechanism, see 23]).
Intuitively, an argumentation about a proposition q proceeds as follows: let r be the current argumentation record; a group member g can perform a certain speech act a if the speech act is possible in r. If a is not legal according to the argumentation protocol, then another member of the group can object to a, that is, insist that the e ects of a are taken back. In any case, it is recorded in the argumentation record that action a was performed by p, and so on.
Argumentation about q may terminate with agreement because q is decided, that is either q or :q is accepted by the group, or without agreement, for instance due to an external termination condition (time, deadline, etc.), or simply because no group member proposes a new move. In the latter case q is considered open. We will not say anything in this paper how to proceed in such a situation. Note, however, that decision criteria (e.g. voting) can be made part of the framework by specifying adequate actions.
In the next subsections we will formalize the components identi ed in the preceding discussion.
The logics
We have not much to say about L, the logic of disputation. This logic depends on the context in which argumentation is carried out. For the logic of procedure things are di erent. This logic is used to reason about the state of argumentation, to determine whether an action is legal, to determine whether a participant of the discussion is committed to a speci c premise, etc. The logic of procedure therefore has to satisfy a number of conditions, namely, it has to be an L-meta logic.
De nition 6 Let L be a logic (of disputation). A logic L 0 is an L-meta logic i 1. L 0 extends sorted rst order logic, 2. among the sorts of L 0 are sorts for agents, actions, argumentation records and L-propositions, 3 . L 0 has a term for each proposition in L, a term S 0 of sort argumentation record (the initial record), and a function symbol do of sort action argumentation record ! argumentation record;
4. L 0 has a unary predicate member (applied to agents), a binary predicate legal (applied to an action and an argumentation record) and a ternary predicate premise (applied to an agent, a proposition, and an argumentation record), 5. L 0 has a ternary predicate accepts (applied to an agent, a proposition, and an argumentation record). This predicate has the following standard interpretation:
accepts(g; q; r) i fp j premise(g; p; r)g`L q:
The use of the uents premise and legal will be explained later. Let us rst comment on the predicate accepts. Intuitively, accepts(g; p; r) says that p follows in L from the premises of g in r. The predicate thus provides a link between meta-logic and logic of disputation. Since its de nition refers to the inference relation of L, this de nition cannot be expressed within L 0 (unless we assume that L is axiomatized in L 0 ). We therefore simply require that accepts is interpreted the right way. Semantically, this means that we disregard models which do not satisfy its standard interpretation. From the implementation point of view it means that one needs access to a theorem prover for L. Note that if L is not decidable then it will not be decidable whether an L 0 interpretation is a model of a set of formulas.
Although we work in a multi-agent setting the function do has two arguments only, an action and an argumentation record. We will represent the agent performing the action as an additional argument of the action. As it turns out this leads to more concise formalizations.
The uent legal is used in the description of the protocol. This obviously is a deontic notion, and one might consider using a full edged deontic logic. It turns out, however, that for many protocols this is not necessary. The protocols we will present in this paper are not based on deontic logic.
The inference relation of L 0 is denoted`L0. In the rest of the paper g (possibly with index) is variable of sort agent, a of sort action, p; q are of sort L-proposition, and r; s of sort argumentation record.
Throughout the paper we assume uniqueness of names, that is unless explicitly speci ed otherwise di erent terms denote di erent objects.
Finally, we introduce the following abbreviations which will turn out to be useful later:
accepted(q; s) : 8x: member(x) ! accepts(x; q; s) prevPremise(g; q; r) : 9a; s:r = do(a; s)^premise(g; q; s) in(a; s) : 9s 0 : do(a; s 0 ) v s where v is as described in Sect. 3.
The group description
Describing the participants and their roles in the debate is straightforward. All we need to do is name the group members and describe their roles using unary predicates.
De nition 7 A group description D group consists of a universally quanti ed formula of the form member(x) x = t 1 _ : : : _ x = t n where the t i are constants of sort agent, together with a (possibly empty) set of atomic formulas describing the roles of the group members. For example, in a discussion involving proponent Jack, opponent John, and determiner Mary we may have D group = fmember(x) x = Jack_x = John_x = Mary; pro(Jack); opp(John); det(Mary)g:
Note that, although we have provided the possibility to use atomic formulas to describe the di erent roles of participants in the argumentation, this will be unnecessary in our examples in the rest of the paper. We will choose constants as names of participants which can be used to identify their roles (proponent, opponent, judge, ...). In more elaborate settings, e.g. if di erent persons have the same role, this is insu cient and additional formulas are needed.
The action description
Action descriptions must specify preconditions and e ects of actions. In our context, actions typically have propositions as arguments, and they refer to and change the state of argumentation. Such states will be represented as argumentation records. These will be discussed in the next subsection. For the time being an intuitive understanding of argumentation records will be su cient.
We use an additional argument for actions to represent the agent performing the action. For instance, claim(g; q) represents that agent g claims proposition q.
Preconditions of an action specify under which conditions the action is possible. Note that this is di erent from when an action is legal (which will be speci ed in the argumentation protocol). For instance, retracting a proposition is possible in a situation s only if the proposition is accepted in s. This is not a consequence of the chosen protocol. Rather, it follows from the meaning of \retract".
As usual in situation calculus we use expressions of the form poss(a; s) to represent that it is possible to perform action a in situation s. A possibility axiom for action a is a (universally quanti ed) rst order formula of the form poss(a; s) F(a; s) where the free variables in F(a; s) are among those in poss(a; s).
The e ects of actions are represented using formulas which describe what is true after the action was performed. If s is a situation, then do(a; s) describes the situation which is obtained when action a is performed in s. The e ects of action a are then simply described by specifying what is true in do(a; s).
The e ects of speech acts in argumentation concern the premises a group member is committed to. We use premise(g; q; s) to express that in situation s agent g is committed to accepting q, where q is a formula in the logic of disputation. An e ect axiom for action a is a (universally quanti ed) rst order formula of the form premise(g; q; do(a; s)) F(g; q; a; s) or :premise(g; q; do(a; s)) F(g; q; a; s)
where F(g; q; a; s) is a formula whose free variables are among the free variables of premise(g; q; do(a; s)).
We are now in a position to de ne action descriptions.
De nition 8 An action description D action is a set of possibility axioms and e ect axioms.
To clarify these notions let us specify possibility and e ect axioms for some actions one typically nds in argumentation contexts. All formulas are implicitly universally quanti ed. :premise(g; q; do(object(g 0 ); s))) :prevPremise(g; q; s)
The precise meaning of the predicate symbols premise and legal will be de ned in the next subsections. We assume that the actions speci ed here are standard in all argumentation systems. Further actions can be de ned as needed. The object action is needed for our solution of the regimentation problem: we admit illegal actions, but only if none of the participants objects. We assume that objecting to an illegal action amounts to \undoing" its e ects. Note, however, that objections to illegal actions in our model have to be raised immediately after the action.
Argumentation records
Argumentation records keep track of the state of argumentation including the argumentation history. We use S 0 to denote the initial argumentation record. Additionally, do(a; s) is the argumentation record representing the situation which is obtained when action a is performed in s. We say r 0 is a subrecord of r i r 0 v r where v is as described in Sect. 3. As mentioned earlier, the following predicates having argumentation records as arguments will be needed (AR stands for argumentation records):
premise : P L AR ! boolean accepts : P L AR ! boolean These two predicates can be read as queries: premise checks whether an L-proposition is a premise an agent is committed to in a state; accepts checks whether an Lproposition is accepted by an agent.
We assume a complete description of the initial record in the following sense:
De nition 9 A set of formulas D S0 is an initial state description if the only argumentation record term appearing in D S0 is S 0 . D S0 is premise-complete if for all ground atoms of the form premise(g; a; S 0 ) we have D una D S0`p remise(g; a; S 0 ) or D una D S0`: premise(g; a; S 0 ). Here D una is the set of unique names axioms for actions, agents and propositions. In many cases premise(g; q; S 0 ) will simply be false, for all g and q. D S0 may also contain state independent information, for instance useful abbreviations, or information about the topic of the debate (see our formalization of Rescher's theory of disputation, Sect. 5).
For the other argumentation records we can determine whether uent premise holds through an update axiom.
De nition 10 An update axiom for uent premise is a universally quanti ed rst order formula of the form premise(g; q; do(a; s)) F(g; q; a; s): where the free variables of F(g; q; a; s) are among those of premise(g; q; do(a; s)). We call the singleton set containing the update axiom D up . As an example consider an update condition for the set of actions described in Section 4.4: 2 premise(g; q; do(a; r)) a = claim(g; q) _ a = concede(g; q) _ 9g 0 : a = object(g 0 )^prevP remise(g; q; r)] _ premise(g; q; r)8 g 0 : (a = retract(g 0 ; q) ! g 6 = g 0 )^(a = object(g 0 ) ! prevPremise(g; q; r))]
This formula is exactly the successor state axiom Reiter would generate from the e ect axioms of the available actions 32]. The rst three lines of the right hand side of the equivalence list the actions and conditions that make premise true in the new state. The last three lines list the conditions under which premise remains true, given it was true in r already.
Note that the update axiom entails the e ect axioms in D action . In principle, we might just forget about writing e ect axioms at all. However, we found it useful to write down e ect axioms rst and to generate the update axiom from these. 2 As usual we assume that^has stronger binding than _.
We therefore leave our representation somewhat redundant, even if this requires the introduction of a notion of compatibility. We next show the following lemma: Lemma 11 The formula described above is complete wrt. an arbitrary premise complete description of the initial state.
Proof Let premise(g; p; r) be a ground atom. We show the result by induction on the number n of appearences of do in r. For n = 0 the result follows from the premise completeness of the initial state description. For n > 0 we can reduce the query to an equivalent query where the number of appearences of do in the record terms is smaller than n. The only subformulas where this is not immediate are the quanti ed subformulas obtained from expanding the macro prevPremise(g; q; r). However, since r is ground it follows from the unique names axioms that there is, in each case, exactly one ground term for each variable satisfying the condition r = do(a 0 ; r 0 ). We can therefore eliminate the quanti ers and continue with those ground terms. The number of appearences of do in the ground term obtained for r 0 is obviously smaller than n.
We conclude this subsection with the following de nition: 
The argumentation protocol
The argumentation protocol describes whether a particular action can be performed legally by a participant of the discussion in a particular state. This is the purpose of the binary predicate legal. Formally, an argumentation protocol is simply a set of formulas of the meta-logic L 0 :
De nition 13 Let L 0 be an L-meta logic. P is an L 0 -argumentation protocol i it is a set of L 0 -formulas.
The argumentation protocol contains the rules of order, that is, it describes declaratively whether a certain action can be performed legally. We assume that, given an argumentation context D, an action a can be legally performed in a state described by argumentation record r i D P`L0 legal(a; r).
Although argumentation protocols describe norms for argumentation we do not require that a deontic logic be used, although this would certainly be a possibility. In our example applications we found it more important to be able to use defeasible rules to describe what is legal. This is why we use default logic to represent the protocols in this paper. Examples of argumentation protocols will be given later.
Static argument systems
We now de ne the central notion of this section. All we have to do is put together the pieces we have identi ed in the preceding discussions.
De nition 14 A (static) argument system AS is a tuple (L; L 0 ; D; P) where L is the logic of disputation, L 0 is an L-meta logic, D is an argumentation context, P is an L 0 -argumentation protocol.
We assume that the starting point of the debate is the initial record S 0 . If the discussion starts with some initial agreement this has to be represented through the description of S 0 . The possible states an argumentation may take are thus represented as argumentation records. As long as an action is possible in a state, it can be performed, be it legal according to the protocol or not. However, objections can be raised against illegal actions. The e ect of an objection is that the e ects of the illegal action are eliminated.
We say an L-formula q is decided in a state r i D P`L0 accepted(q; r) (in which case q is positively decided) or D P`L0 accepted(:q; r) x (in which case q is negatively decided), otherwise q is open.
Let us conclude this section with a remark on consistency. Our argument systems do not provide any theory revision mechanisms for keeping the premises accepted by a group member consistent. This lies fully within the responsability of each agent. Of course, consistency should be of primary interest to each agent -at least if the logic of disputation has no built in inconsistency handling mechanisms. If inconsistent premises imply acceptance of every formula then the agent's opinion has no impact whatsoever on what is accepted by the group as a whole. the third player, the determiner, decides whether the thesis was defended successfully by the proponent or not.
Rescher identi es the following three fundamental moves:
1. Categorical assertions of the form !P where P is a logical formula. The intuitive meaning of !P is \P is the case". This move can be made by the proponent only.
2. Cautious assertions of the form yP where P is a logical formula. The intuitive meaning of yP is \P is the case for all you have shown" or \P is compatible with everything you've said". This move can be made by the opponent only.
3. Provisoed assertions of the form P=Q for \P generally obtains provided that Q". Provisoed assertions can be made by opponent and proponent but have to be preceded or accompanied by one of the two forms of asserting Q.
From the two-page discussion of provisoed assertions in Rescher's book it is obvious that what Rescher had in mind is exactly what is called default in AI today. As we will see soon he even was aware of the speci city principle, i.e. the idea that more speci c defaults have to be preferred over more general ones. He thus anticipated ideas that became research topics in AI years later, see for instance 38, 39, 40] . Each move in the disputation game consists of one or more fundamental moves. A disputation always starts with a categorical assertion of the form !P of the proponent.
The opponent may counter this assertion by a challenge of the form y:P or a provisoed denial of the form :P=Q^yQ for some suitable Q.
In the rst case the proponent can now come up with an argument for P. This argument may have the form of a proof, i.e. the proponent can categorically assert formulas P 1 ; : : : ; P n that logically imply P and then in turn are open to challenge by the opponent. The argument may also have the form of a provisoed assertion accompanied by a categorical assertion of its precondition.
In the second case, i.e. when the proponent has to defend her thesis against a provisoed denial, the proponent can attack either the prerequisite Q of the attacking provisoed assertion or come up with a strong distinction, also called strong exception, of the form P=(Q^R)^!(Q^R). In modern terminology this means that the proponent asserts a more speci c default together with its prerequisite such that the more general default of the opponent is overridden. Now, of course, the opponent in turn may attack this more speci c default by a weak distinction of the form :P=(Q^R^S)^y(Q^R^S).
The game continues like this until one of the two adversaries accepts the arguments, respectively counterarguments, of the other one. If the players cannot make any further reasonable moves or if some xed time limit is exceeded before agreement was reached, then the determiner makes a decision based on the plausibility of the proponent's claims that were not conceded by the opponent.
Rescher assumes that concessions are made tacitly, i.e., if the opponent does not explicitly challenge a claim made by the proponent it is assumed that she concedes the claim (\silence implies consent"). Thus not only actions, but also certain non-actions have e ects in Rescher's account. This is the reason why the update condition which we will need cannot simply be the successor state axiom for the available actions.
Here is a typical debate taken from Note that in Rescher's approach provisoed assertions are always assumed to be \correct" and cannot be challenged directly. This implies that after the provisoed assertion P=Q was made it is impossible for the adversary to make the contradictory provisoed assertion :P=Q. The only way to attack a provisoed assertion is to come up with a more speci c con icting provisoed assertion. We nd this somewhat implausible since disagreement about what is typically the case is as common as any other form of disagreement. Our reconstruction will therefore di er from Rescher in this respect.
Note also that Rescher did not think of the possibility of undermining a provisoed assertion through a \consistent" con icting provisoed assertion. The standard example is Pacifist(Nixon)=Quaker(Nixon) which can be invalidated by the con icting assertion :Pacifist(Nixon)=Republican(Nixon) when both Quaker(Nixon) and Republican(Nixon) is known. Our formalization will admit this form of attacking provisoed assertions as well.
The reconstruction
We now present our reconstruction of Rescher's theory of disputation. 3 Since, as mentioned earlier, several of the main ingredients of Rescher's theory remain vague and informal, this task involves a lot of interpretation, and obviously there is no way of proving the reconstruction correct in any reasonable sense. Moreover, making informal ideas precise often uncovers aspects and options that remained undetected in the original informal presentation of the ideas. This also happened in our reconstruction. Finally, we deliberately deviate from Rescher in some respects which we found unnecessary or implausible. Here is a list:
1. We do not use Rescher's special symbols ! and y. Although Rescher discusses their intuitive meaning extensively it is obvious that the formulas preceded by ! are exactly those stated by the proponent and the formulas preceded by y those stated by the opponent. Since our argument systems keep track of who stated what anyway the symbols are not necessary. 2. We allow disagreement not only about classical formulas but also about default rules.
3. Defaults can be \attacked" not only by more speci c defaults but also by other con icting defaults. In spite of these di erences, we believe to have captured the spirit of Rescher's theory in our reconstruction. It is almost obvious how Rescher's fundamental moves can be modeled. A categorical assertion !P corresponds to a claim made by the proponent.
A cautious assertion yP whose meaning is somewhat ambiguous in Rescher's account corresponds either to a claim by the opponent or to a denial of :P by the opponent. A provisoed assertion P=Q corresponds to the claim of a default rule, by the proponent or the opponent.
We base our approach on default logic with preferences, as described in Sect. 2. Although speci city is not built in, this logic allows to represent preferences (in particular those based on speci city) explicitly. In many cases speci city is not the only source of preferences, and other preference criteria may be more important. For this reason, we think generalizing Rescher in this respect is justi ed. Without going into technical detail we assume that the preference ordering < prefers more speci c defaults, in particular we assume a( possible(declare-winner(g; g 0 ); r) premise(g; q; do(declare-winner(g 0 ; g 00 ); r)) g 00 = pro^topic = q The last formula says that if the proponent is declared winner of the dispute about q (by the determiner), then every group member has to accept q. The constant topic is used to describe the proposition the debate is about. This information (which is independent of the state of argumentation) is added to the description of the initial state D S0 .
The update condition D up is as follows:
premise(g; q; do(a; r)) a = concede(g; q) _ a = claim(g; q) _ a = declare-winner(det; pro)^q = topic _ 9g 0 : a = object(g 0 )^prevP remise(g; q; r)] _ premise(g; q; r)^8g 0 : (a = retract(g 0 ; q) _ a = deny(g 0 ; q) ! g 6 = g 0 )( a = object(g 0 ) ! prevPremise(g; q; r))] _ agt(a) = g^premise(ad(g); q; r)^:in(deny(g; q); do(a; r)): in(retract(g; q); do(a; r)) where ad(pro) = opp, ad(opp) = pro and ad(det) = det and agt(a) = g a = claim(g; q) _ a = concede(g; q) _ a = deny(g; q) _ a = retract(g; q) _ a = object(g) _ a = declare-winner(g; g 0 )
The update condition captures the silence implies consent principle. The opponent as well as the proponent can be committed to a premise claimed by the proponent, respectively opponent, also by not explicitly denying or retracting it. In other words, our update condition models the e ect of certain non-actions. This is re ected in the last alternative which, intuitively, says: if one of the disputing agents performs an action then she is assumed to accept the premises held by the other agent, unless she has (now or earlier) denied or retracted that premise. true : legal(a; r)=legal(a; r) legal(declare-winner(g; g 0 ); r) ! g = det^det 6 = g 0 legal(a; r)^agt(a) = det ! 9g: a = declare-winner(det; g)] legal(declare-winner(det; g); r) ! g = pro^accepts(g; topic; r) _ g = opp^:accepts(g; topic; r)
These rules of order basically say that actions normally are legal. However, only the determiner can declare who the winner of the debate is (and only proponent or opponent can be the winner). Moreover, this is the only action the determiner can make. Finally, certain reasonable restrictions have to hold to make the decision of the determiner legal. For instance, the proponent cannot be declared winner if she does not believe in the topic of the debate any longer.
As usual, objections are possible after illegal actions only. This is guaranteed by the possibility condition for object and does not need to be speci ed in the protocol.
To illustrate the behaviour of this argument system we formalize a legal dispute based on US law. The example was rst discussed by Gordon 11] who also gives additional legal background.
The proponent claims that her security interest in a certain ship is perfected. The opponent denies this. The proponent argues that according to the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC, x9-305) a security interest in goods may be perfected by taking possession of the collateral, and that she currently has possession of the ship. The opponent refers to a federal law called the Ship Mortgage Act (SMA) according to which a security interest in a ship may only be perfected by ling a nancing statement. Such a statement has not been led. Moreover, he claims that according to the principle of Lex Posterior which gives precedence to newer laws UCC should be preferred over SMA since the former is newer. The proponent now refers to the principle of Lex Superior which gives precedence to laws supported by the higher authority. Moreover, the opponent claims that Lex Superior is to be preferred over Lex Posterior. The opponent accepts this. The determiner (erroneously) declares the opponent to be the winner of the debate. Since the premises of both proponent and opponent now imply that the security interest is perfected, the dispute is settled and the determiner's decision is not legal according to the protocol. Therefore the proponent objects. The determiner corrects his mistake and declares the proponent to be the winner of the debate. Here is the formal representation of this debate: The question we want to address now is the following: how can we model that, at any point in the argumentation, participants can start a meta level debate, that is, the rules of order can be made the current topic of discussion?
Note that rules of order speak about propositions expressed in the language of disputation. One possibility would be to amalgamate the languages of L and L 0 , that is to use a self-referential language with quoting (see 23] for a study of such languages) and to express the rules of order in that language. Although this might lead to a very uniform and monolithic treatment of argumentation, we would have to use heavy logical machinery even for the simplest kinds of argumentation. We are not interested here in solving problems related to self-reference. Moreover, a number of approaches dealing with problems of self-reference explicitly use levels (e.g. Russell's typed system of logic which tried to avoid the inconsistency of Frege's original system). We therefore believe that it is more reasonable to keep di erent levels of discussion separate from the beginning. We strongly believe that participants in a discussion are able to distinguish between the levels of discussion they are currently engaged in (object level, meta-level, meta-meta-level etc.). For instance, in a trial it is straightforward to distinguish between arguments about whether, say, Jack is a murderer, or whether a speech act is legal, or whether the rules used to determine legality of speech acts should be changed.
We therefore base our approach on argument systems with di erent argumentation levels. In static argument systems the rules of order can be represented as a xed rule base. Since we now want to model potential disagreement about the rules of order as well as dynamic changes of these rules we have to use an argumentation record not only for the basic level, but also for the meta-level, the meta-meta-level and so on. In each case the argumentation record r i+1 of level i+1 will be used to keep track of the current state of debate at this (meta-) level and to determine whether performing an action a in state r i of level i is legal or not. The action is considered legal if there is agreement about this in the group, in other words, if legal(a; r i ) is provable from the argumentation context of level i together with the formulas accepted at level i + 1.
Dynamic Argument Systems
To represent the di erent levels of argumentation we have to extend the notion of a static argument system accordingly. Each level may have its own argumentation context. However, since we now assume that the current state of debate about the The idea is that in each state the current record of level i describes the state of debate about how to infer whether an action of level i-1 is legal.
Dynamic argument systems are very general. They can model situations where the group involved in the debate varies from level to level. Also the available actions may di er from level to level. In many examples (e.g. in the next section) this full generality is not needed. Note, however, that even if actions like claiming, conceding or retracting often appear in all levels, their proposition arguments will di er from level to level. whose possibility condition mentions legality, the protocol, that is the higher level, is relevant. We want to make sure that objections are possible for an agent g whenever, according to g's current opinion, the action performed earlier was illegal. We therefore have to add those premises which represent g's current view of the protocol to D i to determine the possibility of an objection. Adding only those formulas which are accepted by the whole group in the higher level is not desirable as it would make fewer objections possible. Note that in dynamic argument systems the protocol for actions referring to the highest level is xed. We conclude this section with the following de nition:
De nition 20 Let AS be a dynamic argument system, S = (r 1 ; : : : ; r n ) a possible state of AS. A proposition q (written in the language of L i?1 ) is accepted in S in level i i D i`Li accepted(q; r i ).
7 Case study II: A three level argument system After de ning the notion of a dynamic argument system in the last section we now present one particular such system. Again we will use an example taken from the legal domain to show how the system works. As before our main motivation is to illustrate our notions, not to give a realistic picture of legal argumentation. The argument system to be de ned here, we call it Arg 3 , has 3 levels, that is it has the form: We now de ne the constituents of Arg 3 . We will need a judge, a defender (def), and a prosecutor (pro). We assume that the group is the same in all levels, that is we have member(x) x = judge _ x = def _ x = pro in the group description of all levels. We further assume that actions and update condition are the same in all levels, upto the type of propositions used as arguments of the actions. The actions we admit are claim(g; q); concede(g; q); retract(g; q); decide(g; q); propose(g; q); object(g)
The e ect and possibility axioms for those actions not already de ned in Sect. 4.4 are as follows:
Deciding that a proposition is to be accepted:
possible(decide(g; q); r) premise(g; q; do(decide(g 0 ; q); r))
Proposing a new rule of order:
possible(propose(g; q); r)
Thus deciding and proposing a formula is always possible (although not always legal, as we will see). Note that there is no e ect axiom for propose: proposing a formula has no e ect on the accepted premises. As we will see the only e ect here is that a certain other action becomes legal after a formula was proposed. The speci cation of the axioms for the other actions are as in Sect. 4.4. The speci cation of the update condition (used in all levels) is as follows:
premise(g; q; do(a; r)) a = claim(g; q) _ a = concede(g; q) _ 9g 0 : a = decide(g 0 ; q) _ 9g 0 : a = object(g 0 )^prevP remise(g; q; r)] _ premise(g; q; r)^8g 0 : (a = retract(g 0 ; q) ! g 6 = g 0 )( a = object(g 0 ) ! prevPremise(g; q; r))]
Note that Rescher's silence implies consent principle is not valid in our dynamic argument system: according to the speci cation of the update condition all concessions have to be explicit. In addition, the judge can decide that all participants of the discussion have to accept a certain proposition. As the underlying logic of all levels we use (standard) default logic with the required sorts and predicates.
The (meta-meta-) protocol P simply says that on the highest level every action is illegal, that is P = f:legal(a; s)g. This has the e ect that the meta-protocol, represented in level 3, can only be changed if nobody objects.
Let us consider a dispute about whether Jack is a murderer. legal(claim(g; illegal-info(q)); r) legal(propose(g; q); r) legal(decide(judge; q); do(propose(g; q); r)) legal(retract(judge; q); r) Intuitively, there is agreement in MR 0 that only the judge can make decisions regarding basic level propositions. Furthermore, there is agreement in MMR 0 that the judge can decide that a meta level proposition, that is a rule of order, is to be accepted, given the proposition was proposed. Additionally, the judge can retract meta level propositions, and each group member can claim that information was illegally obtained (illegal-info(q)).
The dispute now proceeds as follows: there is evidence (victim's blood on Jack's shoe) which convicts Jack as the murderer. However, the evidence was obtained illegally. The clever defender proposes to change the rules of order in such a way that illegal evidence cannot be used. The judge agrees and the prosecutor is forced to retract his claim since this is the only action he can legally perform in this situation.
We use R as abbreviation for the rule illegal-info(q)^premise(pro; q; r)^a 6 = retract(pro; q) ! :legal(a; r)
In addition, we use the following abbreviations: AR 1 = do(claim(pro; on(blood; shoe)); AR 0 ) MR 1 = do(claim(def; illegal-info(on(blood; shoe))); MR 0 ) MR 2 = do(decide(judge; illegal-info(on(blood; shoe))); MR 1 ) MR 3 = do(propose(def; R); MR 2 ) MR 4 = do(decide(judge; R); MR 3 ) AR 2 = do(retract(pro; on(blood; shoe)); AR 1 ) Argumentation proceeds as follows: S 0 = (AR 0 ; MR 0 ; MMR 0 ) the initial argumentation state S 1 = (AR 1 ; MR 0 ; MMR 0 ) pro claims there was blood on Jack's shoe S 2 = (AR 1 ; MR 1 ; MMR 0 ) def claims this evidence was obtained illegally S 3 = (AR 1 ; MR 2 ; MMR 0 ) judge decides evidence is illegal S 4 = (AR 1 ; MR 3 ; MMR 0 ) def proposes new rule of order S 5 = (AR 1 ; MR 4 ; MMR 0 ) judge decides the new rule is to be accepted S 6 = (AR 2 ; MR 4 ; MMR 0 ) pro has to retract the evidence This means that in S 6 none of the participants accepts that Jack is the murderer. In order to convict Jack, the prosecutor has to come up with a new strategy based on legal evidence only.
Discussion and related work
During recent years the eld of AI has seen a continuously growing interest in problem solving techniques which are based on the cooperation of multiple intelligent agents. To model the cooperation of such agents one has to come up with models of how they communicate, negotiate, exchange arguments, and settle disputes.
There is a vast amount of literature on this topic. In particular, negotiation has been a subject of central interest. The term negotiation has been used in a variety of ways. Zlotkin and Rosenschein 46, 34] have focussed on task redistribution. The overall goal of the negotiation here is to minimize the costs associated with tasks to be performed by agents. Others have investigated negotiation in the context of plan generation 8], goal modi cation 36], argumentation-based proposal generation 13] or negotiation under time constraints 14]. In these papers the focus is more on the optimization of the associated utility. The logical structure of the argumentation plays a minor role, and the underlying logical language is extremely simple.
There is also an important di erence between our notion of argumentation and the one used by Kraus, Sycara and Evenchik 35]. What they are studying is dialogues in which one party tries to persuade another party to adopt (or change) a certain intention for action. Kraus et al. model this by representing agents as BDI (beliefdesire -intention) architectures. Arguments are pieces of information which attempt to change the other agent's intentions by changing the other agent's beliefs about how it can or cannot satisfy its goals or desires.
Our interest in this paper was on debate or critical discussion, i.e., a form of communication where one or more participants try to convince others that a certain proposition holds by communicating the beliefs on which the proposition rests. Intentions of the agents did not play a role in our formalization. It is a topic of future research whether our framework can be applied fruitfully to the type of dialogues studied by Kraus et al. and others. Of course, a unifying theory for di erent types of dialogues would be a nice thing to have, in particular since in practice di erent types of dialogues will often be intertwined.
Here is a list of the contributions of this paper:
As mentioned in the introduction restricted forms of meta-argumentation were investigated by Vreeswijk 42] . He uses propositional constants to represent certain aspects of the argumentation protocol, so-called partial protocol speci cations (PPSs). A PPS can be adopted or given up during argumentation which modi es the behaviour of the implementation of the core protocol in a prede ned way. It should be obvious that, due to the declarative representation of the protocol, our approach is much more exible. Changes to the protocol are not restricted to a xed number of prede ned properties which can be switched on or o . Moreover, in our approach meta-argumentation is not restricted to one single meta-level but can be extended to an arbitrary number of levels.
The argumentation protocols we used in our examples were extremely simplistic. Needless to say that real argumentation processes follow much more sophisticated rules of order. A widely used standard protocol for parliamentary debate was developed by General Robert in the last century. His rules are now known as Robert's Rules of Order (RRO). Prakken 26] has demonstrated how RRO can be formalized. It is straightforward to use this formalization as part of the speci cation of a dynamic argument system. This would lead to a system which is much more realistic than the ones we used here to illustrate our notions.
In future work we plan to implement systems based on our model which are based on such more realistic protocols. We will also try to classify types of protocols and investigate notions of fairness in the context of our approach.
The framework developed in this paper is highly general. We have demonstrated that it provides the necessary means to formalize interesting types of discussions. To the best of our knowledge a formal de nition of argument systems which is general enough to capture dialogues of the form described in our murder case example has not been given before. We hope that our formalization will prove helpful, not only for the long term AI goal of developing arti cial arguing agents but also for somewhat less ambitious (some would say more realistic) goals. For instance, our formalization could be the formal basis of a mediating system (see Zeno, http://nathan.gmd.de/projects/zeno/zenoSystem.html, for an interesting example) supporting, say, electronic discussions among natural agents. Such a system could keep track of the state of the discussion, help detecting inconsistencies in the statements of the participants, and give warnings if certain speech acts violate the accepted rules of order.
